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Abstract
Why does venture capital work in some countries but not in others? This clinical study of the
first German venture capital firm examines the difficulties of creating a venture capital market
in a bank-based financial system. The analysis identifies the problem of creating appropriate
governance structures to protect investor returns. It exposes the difficulties of established
banks - not to mention government - to devise venture investment strategies. It identifies the
availability of high quality entrepreneurs as a critical complement. And it provides a
reinterpretation of the hypothesis of Black and Gilson (1997), arguing that the existence of an
active stock market is a necessary, but by no means sufficient condition for the development
of venture capital.
JEL Code: G2, G3, M13.
Ralf Becker












We would like to thank Bob Bruner, Bruno Cassiman, Anne Devine, Ron Gilson, Rainer
Hellmann, Philip Joos, Colin Mayer, Manju Puri, Anne Sheldon and seminar participant at the
“Alternative Forms of Organization” conference in Venice (May 1999), the “Financing R&D
in science-based industries: A comparative analysis at the European level” conference in
Madrid (May 2000), and at Wharton (September 2001) for their many helpful comments.
Special thanks also to Karl-Heinz Fanselow for his generous support. The authors would like
to thank the Center for Entrepreneurial Studies at the Stanford Graduate School of Business
for their financial support.1 Introduction
How does venture capital take root in an economy? While it is ﬁrmly established
and sophisticated in the US, many countries face an institutional environment that
is quite diﬀerent. Banks often play a more dominant role, and the prominence of
entrepreneurship diﬀers signiﬁcantly across countries. At present, little is known
about what conditions are necessary to create a venture capital market, how existing
ﬁnancial institutions - such as banks - can aﬀect its development, and what role
government might have in the process.
In this paper, we study the original attempt to promote venture capital in Ger-
many. Germany is interesting because it is a leading industrial nation and because
it has a set of institutions that is distinctly diﬀerent from the US. Most importantly,
there was an explicit attempt to create a venture capital industry: the founding of the
Deutsche Wagnisﬁnanzierungsgesellschaft, the ﬁrst German venture capital fund (for
apparent reasons, we will refer to it by its abbreviation, “WFG“1). The experiment
was a complete failure. The WFG had signiﬁcant ﬁnancial losses, resulting in a rate
of return below -25%, and never succeeded in inducing larger market development.
The history of the WFG provides a rare opportunity to study how venture capital
may (fail to) develop in an environment that is not naturally preordained for it.
O u ra n a l y s i su n c o v e r sm u l t i p l el a y e r so fr e a s o n sf o rw h yi tw a ss od i ﬃcult to create
venture capital in Germany. On a ﬁrst level, we can trace the failure of the WFG
back to inappropriate contracting and governance structures. The contracts that the
WFG oﬀered to entrepreneurs contained too little protection for investors, and the
governance structure prevented venture capitalists from adding value to or exercising
control over their portfolio companies. Why then did the WFG ever engage in such
unfavorable transactions?
On a second level, we uncover more profound forces that led the WFG to oﬀer
c o n t r a c t st h a td i dn o tm a x i m i z es h a r e h o l d er wealth. Indeed, the shareholders of the
WFG (large German banks and the government) pursued interests that were diﬀerent
from shareholder wealth maximization. While the government was most concerned
about the commercialization of new technologies, the banks worried about minimizing
any risks to their reputation. This conﬂict of interests may help to explain the use of
seemingly inappropriate contractual and governance structures.
However, we then need to ask whether a diﬀerently structured venture capital fund
could have solved the problems of the WFG, or whether they were endemic. Subse-
quent entrants into the German venture capital market, both German and from the
Anglo-Saxon world, encountered similar problems as the WFG. This suggests deeper
problems for the development of a viable venture capital industry, problems rooted
in the German institutional structure. We identify the availability of high quality
entrepreneurs and the incentives for entrepreneurship as critical determinants. Our
analysis sheds some new light on the hypothesis of Black and Gilson (1997) about
1The name roughly translates into German Venture Financing Corporation.the importance of an active stock market for the development of venture capital. We
show that while a stock market is necessary, it is by no means suﬃcient - further com-
plementary changes in the economic system must precede the emergence of venture
capital.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the the-
oretical foundations of our research. Section 3 describes our research methodology.
Section 4 outlines the history and performance of the WFG. Section 5 examines the
contractual and governance-related constraints. Section 6 looks at the underlying
conﬂicts of interest between the managers and owners of the WFG. Section 7 shows
how the problems of the WFG are a reﬂection of the German system and its incen-
tives for entrepreneurship. Section 8 uses these insights to revisit the question of the
role of stock markets in the development of a venture capital industry. Section 9
summarizes the results and concludes the paper.
2 Theoretical foundations
Ever since Jensen and Mecklin (1976), agency costs have played a central role in
ﬁnancial theories. The seminal papers of Diamond (1984), Fama (1985) and Stiglitz
(1985) suggested that ﬁnancial intermediaries - mainly banks - could play a role
in the reduction of agency costs (see Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993) for a useful
survey). Venture capital is a diﬀerent form of ﬁnancial intermediation, focusing on
the provision of equity ﬁnancing to private companies. The work of Admati and
Pﬂeiderer (1994), Berglöf (1994), Gompers (1995), Hellmann (1998, 2002), Hellmann
and Puri (1999, 2000), Kaplan and Strömberg (1999), Lerner (1995) and Sahlman
(1990) shows how venture capitalists solve a frequently more extreme set of agency
problems. Beyond the monitoring and certiﬁcation role, this literature emphasizes
value-added support and governance control as key roles played by venture capitalists.
Great focus has been put on the dyadic relationship between companies and their
investors. To truly understand ﬁnancial institutions though it is necessary to ana-
lyze how they ﬁt into their economic system. The work of Bebchuk and Roe (1999),
Gilson (1996), Gilson and Roe (1993), Roe (1998) and others shows how corporate
ﬁnance and corporate governance are embedded in and largely determined by the
larger institutional economic systems. The work of La Porta et al. (1997, 1999)
and Demirgüç-Kunt and Maksimovic (1999) argues that diﬀerent economic systems
provide diﬀerent levels of protection to minority shareholders, and shows how this
aﬀects the way ﬁnancial intermediation is organized. And the work of Allen and Gale
(2000), Aoki (2000), Aoki and Patrick (1994) or Boot and Thakor (1997), examines
more speciﬁcally how ﬁnancial intermediaries work diﬀerently in diﬀerent economic
systems. A central theme of this literature is to compare bank-based with stock-
market-based systems. Because of data constraints, the empirical work in this area
has focused mainly on large, publicly traded companies, leaving aside private compa-
nies that often constitute a larger segment of the economy, especially in bank-basedsystems.
This paper examines how venture capital is created in an environment that is not
naturally pre-ordained for it. It begins with an agency theoretic view, examining
the contracts and governance relationships between the WFG and its entrepreneurs.
However, to understand some of the peculiarities of these arrangements, we need
to examine how they are shaped by the institutional environment. We consider
the relationship between the WFG and its owners - the incumbent banks and the
government. This introduces a second layer of agency problems that helps to explain
the relationships between the WFG and its entrepreneurs. We also examine how a
system-wide lack of incentives for entrepreneurship may undermine the development
of venture capital.
We draw on the theory of complementarities (see Milgrom and Roberts, 1990,
1994, 1995), which examines equilibrium congruence among agents when the beneﬁt
of one agent’s action is enhanced by the other agents’ actions. In such a framework,
we can endogenously understand institutions. There may be multiple equilibria, and
diﬀerent countries may end up in diﬀerent equilibria. A key insight from this theory
is that if one introduces a new institution - such as the ﬁrst venture capital fund
in a country - its eﬀect and own viability can vary considerably: it depends on
which equilibrium pre-exists in the economy. Milgrom and Roberts show that in an
equilibrium with complementarities any single deviation is necessarily unproﬁtable:
either some agent (possibly the government) has to be willing to incur losses for
institutional change, or the initial change must be accompanied by further changes
in the system so that the system can move toward a new equilibrium.
Recently, a small literature has begun to address the question of how venture
capital may emerge in countries with diﬀerent institutional arrangements. The most
important contribution is by Black and Gilson (1997). They argue that the lack of
an active stock market in a bank-based system hampers the development of a ven-
ture capital industry. Milhaupt (1997) examines how venture capital (fails to) ﬁt
into the Japanese corporate governance system. Jeng and Wells (1997) provide an
empirical cross-country comparison of venture capital markets, though their analysis
is limited by the lack of data comparability. Gompers and Lerner (1998) empirically
examine the US venture capital market and suggest that demand-side considerations
may determine the size of a venture capital market (i.e. the ﬁnancing needs of en-
trepreneurs).
3 Research methodology
The objective of this paper is to shed light on the dark side of complementarities.
Theory suggests that in a complementary system the return to a single institutional
innovation is negative. Is there any empirical evidence for this? Who would want to
pursue such institutional innovations, and why? And how does an institution develop
under such adverse circumstances?We examine one of the rare cases where we can observe a natural experiment
involving institutional change. The WFG was created with the explicit purpose of
being a catalyst for institutional change, more speciﬁcally for the creation of a German
venture capital market. This is important not only because of the role of venture
capital for economic growth, but also for its implications on the corporate governance
debate. Moreover, the natural experiment of the WFG encountered severe problems
that led to fundamental rethinking and restructuring. It provides a unique perspective
on how a new institution may adapt in a hostile environment.
Our research approach is inherently multi-disciplinary. Its conceptual foundation
is the theory of corporate governance and ﬁnancial intermediation, as well as the the-
ory of complementarities and systemic change. At the core of the analysis is a clinical
study of the history of the WFG - the history of the creation of the German venture
capital market. This involves historical content analysis, extensive ﬁeld research and
ﬁnally some simple statistical hypothesis testing.
Why Germany and the WFG? Germany is not only one of the leading economic
nations, it is also a leading example of a bank-based ﬁnancial system that is diﬀerent
from the market-based Anglo-Saxon system. And the WFG was a conscious attempt
to promote the development of a German venture capital market. Because both
t h eg o v e r n m e n ta n dt h em a i ni n c u m b e n tﬁnancial institutions (all signiﬁcant banks)
participated, some light is shed on their respective motives. The many mistakes and
changes that occurred in the early days of the WFG provide a rich opportunity to
study elements that are central to the development of any venture capital market.
For the historic analysis, we identify a large variety of original and secondary
sources that document the history of the WFG and its surrounding economic envi-
ronment. We gathered all references to the WFG in the German academic literature
and collected what we believe to be a fairly complete set of contemporary articles in
t h eG e r m a nb u s i n e s sp r e s so nt h eW F G . 2 Finally, we extensively searched the Ger-
man press and looked for broader sources of information, sources that we think are
helpful to shed light on atmosphere and mood in Germany at the time of the WFG’s
incorporation, and so on factors that the founders of the WFG were keenly aware of.
For the ﬁeld study, we conducted interviews in Germany with managers of the
WFG, recipients of venture capital from the WFG and managers of other German
private equity companies. Most of them actively participated in the industry in the
1970s and 1980s.3 To obtain actual data from venture capital ﬁr m si sd i ﬃcult in the
2Some of the most useful German language references include Büschgen (1985), Fanselow (1983,
1985, 1988), Kokalj and Albach (1987), Pohl (1978), Schmidt (1988), Schmidt and Willms (1987)
and Stedler (1993).
3Our interviewees were Karl-Heinz Fanselow, CEO of the WFG since 1978 and CEO of all of
its successor organizations; Reinhard Löﬄer, manager at the WFG and its successor organizations;
Jochen Tschunke, former CEO of C2000; Andrew Richards, partner with 3I; Waldemar Jantz,
partner with TVM; Mr. Firmenich, CEO of Commerz UBG; Dr. Martin Halusa, partner with
APAX/Munich; Dr. Fromann, chairman of BVK; Rolf Dienst, CEO of Wellington Finanz and
Jörg Kreisel, manager at GENES (Cologne). Since most of these interviews were conducted inUS and almost impossible in Germany. We were fortunate, however, to obtain access
to a set of documents not generally available to the public. In particular, we obtained
copies of all annual reports of the WFG. While the annual reports only provide yearly
and sometimes aggregated data, they nonetheless oﬀer some insight on questions that
are usually not accessible for research at all.4
As with any clinical study, our evidence is meant to be persuasive on the whole and
does not pretend to be conclusive in a formal sense. The main objective of the paper
is to empirically identify the various economic forces that aﬀect the development of
venture capital, to gauge their relative importance in a non-US context and in the
process to derive new insights that will hopefully stimulate further theoretical and
empirical work.
4 The history and performance of the WFG
T h eW F Gw a sa no u t r i g h tf a i l u r e .I tr e c o r d e dal o s se v e r yy e a rd u r i n gt h eﬁrst nine
years and small proﬁts thereafter (see ﬁgures 1 and 2). The cumulative losses over
its lifetime amounted to 38.4 million DM. Through a downside risk guarantee the
government bore 37.7 million DM of these losses, leaving the banks with less than
a million DM of actual losses. There were no revenues in the ﬁrst three years, and
the revenues from the government subsidy exceeded the revenue from investments for
every year up to 1984 when the government and the WFG parted ways (see table
1). The internal rate of return for the investment of the WFG was -25.07%. This is
the value for the overall portfolio, excludin gt h eg o v e r n m e n ts u b s i d y .I fw ec o u n tt h e
subsidy as revenues for the WFG, the internal rate of return was -11.41%. Note also
that these are nominal rates of return ignoring inﬂation. The real rates of return are
thus even lower.
In venture capital, revenues are mainly generated at the time of exit of the investor.
The main methods of exit are IPOs, acquisitions, buy-backs (where the entrepreneur
repurchases the shares) or bankruptcy. Figures 3-5 show some detail on how compa-
nies exited; we notice a predominance of bankruptcies, acquisitions and buy-backs.
Most of the ﬁrms in the acquisitions and buy-backs category were no proﬁtable in-
vestments. More than two thirds of the WFG’s companies resulted in partial or total
losses, and less than 20% of the portfolio companies ever generated any returns. By
comparison, Sahlman (1990) estimates that in a typical US venture capital portfolio
about one third of all investments result in a partial or total loss, and two thirds of
German, we use content-based translations for most quotes. We suppress the identity of individual
interviewees, except for those instances where the identity is material to the understanding of the
quote.
4Unfortunately, it was impossible to secure deal-speciﬁc data. Note, however, that this kind of
data is also not generally available in the US, where access to data for researchers tends to be easier




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   
 

















































































































































































































































































































ythe companies generate positive returns.5
The WFG was initially endowed with 10 million DM of capital, which was sub-
sequently raised to 30 million DM and then to 50 million DM. This modest capital
base was provided by an impressive list of 29 banks, including all big German retail
banks and the head organizations of the savings and loan institutions (see table 2).
To induce all these banks to contribute even such a small amount of money, the gov-
ernment provided a generous downside guarantee, insuring up to 75% of the losses
that the WFG might incur. The intended time-horizon was 15 years. The board of
directors was comprised of two industry representatives, three bank representatives,
two management consultants, two scientists, and three government administrators,
one each of the ministries of commerce, ﬁnance, and research & development.
We should point out that during the same period the US venture capital market
had its ﬁrst signiﬁcant growth period. Gompers and Lerner (1998) report that the
size of the US venture capital pool increased from $427 million in 1978 to $5,453
million in 1983, and the number of venture capital-backed IPOs from 6 in 1978 to
121 in 1983.6 T h em i s f o r t u n eo ft h eW F Gc a nt h u sn o tb eb l a m e do na no v e r a l l
slump of venture capital activity.
The abysmal performance of the WFG did not go unnoticed. Over the ﬁrst
three years, four new CEOs were hired in the hope of addressing the instantly vis-
ible shortcomings, and of turning around the WFG. In November 1978, Karl-Heinz
Fanselow (the latest new co-CEO) realized that, as he says, the WFG was essentially
bankrupt. The board of directors put him alone at the helm of the WFG soon there-
after, a position he retained until the demise of the WFG. Under his leadership the
WFG underwent a fundamental transformation. In 1984, the WFG ended its rela-
tionship with the government and decided not to make any further investments. At
this time, ﬁve of the largest banks created a new venture capital fund, called WFGneu
(new WFG), which would continue to invest, and also oversaw the liquidation of the
existing portfolio of the old WFG.
The WFG failed to create a German venture capital industry. How could this
well-intended experiment go so wrong? Why could even the most prominent German
ﬁnancial institutions not make this small venture capital fund work? And why was it
impossible to develop a venture capital business in one of the world’s most advanced
economies?
5The numbers of the WFG and Sahlman are not directly comparable: Sahlman measures invest-
ments by the amount invested, the WFG based on the number of projects. Since the WFG invested
relatively similar amounts in all of its companies, and made almost no follow-up investments, the
measurement diﬀerence is not as important as it may seem at ﬁrst.
61983 was the peak of this ﬁrst venture capital boom, followed by a period of substantial vari-
ability. 
 
Table 2:  Alphabetical List of Investors of the WFG 
 
1.  Badische Bank AG (Mannheim) 
2.  Bank für Gemeinwirtschaft AG (Frankfurt) 
3. Bayerische  Hypotheken-  und Wechselbank AG (München) 
4. Bayerische  Landesbank, Girozentrale (München) 
5.  Bayerische Vereinsbank AG (München) 
6.  Berliner Handels- und Frankfurter Bank KGaA (Frankfurt) 
7.  Commerzbank AG (Düsseldorf) 
8.  Delbrück & Co (Frankfurt) 
9.  Deutsche Bank AG (Frankfurt) 
10. Deutsche Genossenschaftsbank (Frankfurt) 
11. Deutsche Girozentrale - Deutsche Kommunalbank (Frankfurt) 
12. Dresdner Bank AG (Frankfurt) 
13. Effectenbank-Warburg AG (Frankfurt) 
14. Hamburgische Landesbank, Girozentrale (Hamburg) 
15. Hessische Landesbank, Girozentrale (Frankfurt) 
16. Industriekreditbank AG, Deutsche Industriebank (Düsseldorf) 
17. Landesbank Rheinland-Pfalz, Girozentrale (Mainz) 
18. Landesbank Saar, Girozentrale (Saarbrücken) (from 1976/77 onwards) 
19. Landesbank Schleswig-Holstein, Girozentrale (Kiel) 
20. Landeskreditbank Baden-Württemberg (Karlsruhe) 
21. Merck, Finck & Co. (München) 
22. Norddeutsche Landesbank, Girozentrale (Hannover) 
23. Sal. Oppenheim jr. & Cie (Köln) 
24. Sparkasse der Stadt Berlin West (Berlin) (from 1976/77 onwards) 
25. Trinkhaus & Burkhardt (Düsseldorf) 
26. M. M. Warburg-Brinckmann, Wirtz & Co (Hamburg) 
27. Westdeutsche Landesbank, Girozentrale (Düsseldorf) 
28. Westfalenbank AG (Bochum) 
29. Württembergische Bank AG (Stuttgart) (merged in 1977 with Badische Bank AG) 5 The relationship between venture capitalists and
entrepreneurs
Conjecture 1 The failure of the WFG was related to the use of inappropriate con-
tractual instruments and governance relationships between the venture capitalists and
the entrepreneurs.
At the heart of venture capital is the process of selecting promising entrepreneurial
companies, helping them to develop their potential, and participating in the rents gen-
erated by successful companies (Bygrave and Timmons (1992); Gompers and Lerner
(1999)). The WFG could not successfully get this process going.
An important aspect of US venture capital is the hands-on support provided by
venture capitalists. The WFG soon realized the need for such hands-on support.
All of its ﬁrst portfolio companies struggled to develop their products and did not
succeed in the market. Since many of the entrepreneurs had more of a technological
background, the WFG focused on providing complementary legal and tax advice.
The notion of monitoring, however, was limited to hiring controllers that helped the
portfolio companies to develop and maintain their accounting systems (WFG (1977)).
While the entrepreneurs welcomed such technical help, strategic advice was neither
desired nor accepted. As Fanselow notes
“Entrepreneurs were not very open to a hands-on venture capital ap-
proach. I found them arrogant. They did not see that an idea alone does
not imply success - they considered themselves as inventors and disliked
and disrespected business aspects.“
Beyond monitoring and support, US venture capitalists also hold extensive control
rights over the entrepreneurs they ﬁnance (Hellmann (1998)). The WFG, however,
found out that in order to do business with German entrepreneurs it could not assume
any control. Fanselow recalls
“Nobody would have accepted to give up a majority stake to the venture
capitalist. People called that exploitation.”
Interviews with entrepreneurs conﬁrmed these strong norms against investor con-
trol. Asked for his reasons to choose the WFG, one entrepreneur underlines:
“We were in need of external capital but did not want any hands-on
involvement or interference with management. We chose the WFG solely
because they oﬀered the best terms.“
Indeed, the WFG only took minority equity positions, did not obtain any of
the control rights commonly assumed by US venture capitalists, and thus saw its
inﬂuence on portfolio companies severely curtailed - companies that in most cases
were managed by inexperienced rookie entrepreneurs. Hence Fanselow’s assessment
that:“ T h a ti sw h yt h ef a i l u r er a t ew a ss oh i g h . W ec o u l dn o tr e p l a c ea ni n -
competent management team.“
The WFG could not interfere in any important management decision, and never
replaced the founders. By comparison, Hellmann and Puri (2000) examine a sample
of Silicon Valley companies and ﬁnd that professional managers replace more than
half of all new entrepreneurs.7
The German use of the term venture capital encapsulates two distinct markets.
One is an early stage venture capital market for entrepreneurs who want to create new
companies that have not yet proven their economic viability. The other is a late stage
venture capital market, which in the US might be called non-venture private equity
(Fenn, Liang and Prowse (1995)). This market consists of more mature companies
which already have established themselves in their markets and that require private
equity for growth or capital structure reasons. The agency problems of moral hazard
and adverse selection are much more severe in the early stage venture capital market
(Gompers (1995)).
If the WFG’s contracts and governance relationships prevented it from solving
important agency problems, a natural conjecture is that this should have been par-
ticularly harmful to early stage investments. Consider the following excerpt from
the 1980 annual report, which tried to explain the poor performance of its portfolio
companies (WFG (1980)):
“The lack of experience of the entrepreneurs in mastering the various,
very complex tasks of management is the main reason for the failure of
the projects. These ﬁrms fail in the start-up phase, before one could ever
answer the question of whether they would be successful in the market.”
In order to examine this claim more closely, we use the available data from the
WFG’s annual reports to examine relationships between a variety of success measures
of the WFG and its portfolio mix of early versus late stage investments. Our analysis
is constrained by the aggregate nature of the data from the annual reports and a
low number of observations; it is nonetheless helpful to identify some broad trends.
Figure 7 shows changes in the composition of the WFG’s portfolio. Table 4 shows
the results from a series of OLS regressions that look at the eﬀect of the portfolio
mix (as measured by the proportion of late stage companies in a year cohort) on
the proportion of successful investments in that cohort (as measured by a proﬁtable
outcome for the WFG). This SUCCESS-regression shows a strong impact of portfolio
maturity on success. Another way of measuring the performance of a venture capital
fund is revenues. The average gestation of a venture capital investment is between 4 to
5 years. The results of two GESTATION-regressions show a statistically signiﬁcant
7Along similar lines, Kaplan and Strömberg (1999) conﬁrm that venture capitalists typically
hold controlling positions in the companies they ﬁnance. Even at the time of the IPO, Baker and






































































































































































Table 4:  
 
The impact of portfolio maturity on investment success 
 
This table presents the results from a series of OLS regressions. SUCCESS measures the 
percentage of companies in a particular year cohort that generated a positive return to the 
WFG. STAGE measures the proportion of companies in a particular year cohort that were 
classified as being in a growth or other late stage at the time of the WFG’s investment. 
REVENUE are the revenues of the WFG, excluding the government subsidy. STAGE_i 
are the i-years lagged values of STAGE. Numbers in parenthesis are t-ratios using 
White’s heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors (White, 1980). We also report the 
correlation coefficient between the dependent and independent variables.  
 
 
Regression:   SUCCESS      Gestation_4   Gestation_5 
 
 
Dependent  variable  SUCCESS    REVENUE   REVENUE 
 
Intercept   -0.0637433    0.7803754   1.137789* 
   (-0.914)    (0.988)    (1.839) 
 
STAGE   0.4291683***   
   (4.107) 
 
STAGE_4       2.485186** 
       (2.733) 
 
STAGE_5          1.931644* 
          (2.307) 
 
 
Correlation   0.7648     0.6292    0.5190 
coefficient 
 
F-statistic   16.87***    7.47**    5.32* 
 
R-squared   0.5849     0.3958    0.2694 
 
#  of  observations  9     9    9 
 
 
*   significantly different from zero at the 10% level 
**   significantly different from zero at the 5% level 
*** significantly different from zero at the 1% level relationship between the lagged values of the portfolio maturity and the revenues
of the WFG.8 These results all suggest a positive relationship between the stage of
companies and the success of the investment portfolio. This is consistent with the
notion that the WFG faced more substantial problems with early stage companies,
where agency problems were more severe, and where the inability to closely monitor
and control mattered most.9
A unique contractual arrangement further contributed to the problems of the
WFG: the WFG oﬀered entrepreneurs a contract with a buy back option at cost plus
some moderate interest - an unusual self-imposed cap on the upside of its investments.
Its bylaws also stipulated that the WFG should exit from a company as soon as it
became economically viable, which equally limited the potential returns for the WFG.
As a consequence, the WFG could ﬁnd itself in a contractual situation that prevented
it from participating in the upside of a deal. Indeed, out of a total of 14 entrepreneurs
with proﬁtable businesses, 6 exercised their rights to buy back their shares - which
means that the WFG recovered nothing more than its cost on 40% of its successful
investments.
W i t hh i n d s i g h ti ti sh a r dt ob e l i e v et h a tt h eW F Ge v e ro ﬀered such unfavorable
contracts, let alone made investments with so little investor protection. Where did
these contracting notions come from? One could conjecture that people simply did
not understand venture capital and the consequences of these contracting practices.
But this is not true. Just prior to the launch of the WFG, a Professor Gerke (1975)
wrote an article in a prominent German economic journal that explained with almost
prophetic vision why the approach of the WFG was doomed to fail. Among other
things, he explicitly warned against caps on returns or limits on how long the WFG
could keep its portfolio companies. If these contracting weaknesses not only could
have but in fact were anticipated, we face a deeper problem. All the contracting
restrictions and governance arrangements favored the entrepreneur over the investor.
Some of them reﬂected the German governance system and were outside the control of
the WFG. But others, such as the buy-back provisions, were the WFG’s own choice.
Why would the shareholders of the WFG impose such restrictions on themselves?
This naturally leads us to examine the relationship between the WFG and its own
investors: German banks and the government.
8We reran the regression including both lagged variables, and found that both of them were still
statistically signiﬁcant at 10%.
9All tests exclude a small number of investments that were made under a special investment















































































































































































n6 The relationship between venture capitalists and
their own investors
Conjecture 2 The diﬃculties of the WFG to devise proﬁtable relationships with
their entrepreneurs were related to conﬂicting objectives of its own investors, the
government and the established banks.
To understand the relationship between the WFG and its owners, we ﬁrst need
to retrace the original motivations that led to its creation. Table 3 provides some
background to put the creation of the WFG into its historic context. Throughout the
sixties, there was a growing concern about an equity gap in Germany. While in the
mid-sixties a typical German company still had 35% equity, this percentage had fallen
to 25% by the early 1970s. Small and medium sized companies had even less equity,
about 20%.10 After the ﬁrst oil shock, the problem became even more pressing as
higher interest rates burdened the balance sheets of companies. Despite the universal
banking laws, banks very rarely held equity in the ﬁrms they ﬁnanced - while they
held stock in some of the largest publicly listed companies, they essentially held no
equity in private companies, except temporarily in a turn-around situation. The
banks’ interest in a market for private equity was rather limited. They viewed their
loan business as their core activity, and they were reluctant to take on the additional
risk exposure. The Herstatt scandal in 1974, the biggest banking failure in the history
of Germany, reinforced the risk-aversion of banks. An on-going public debate about
the power of banks led to further insecurity. It was commonplace to criticize banks for
wielding too much control, especially over the so-called Mittelstand (the many small
to medium-sized companies that constitute the backbone of the German economy).
The public debate about the equity gap had been paralleled by a debate about a
technology-market gap in the German economy. While German universities and re-
search institutions were producing large amounts of high quality scientiﬁc output, the
transmission of knowledge was seriously lacking. Employment stability in the research
sector and the high social status of university professors and research fellows provided
little incentive for scientists to commercialize their discoveries. Those researchers who
tried to implement their ideas as entrepreneurs often showed a total lack of interest,
and skill, as managers.11 Contacts (not to speak of joint ventures) between academia
and industry were rare, partly because universities were almost entirely funded out
of state and federal means. As a consequence, while German companies tended to
do well in terms of incremental process innovation and growth in existing markets,
there was a concern about the lack of adoption of new technologies, and the creation
of new products and markets.
10Many German ﬁrms also have some pseudo-equity or reserves (called Rückstellungen) which
may account for another 20% of assets. Still, the fraction of equity remains lower than in the
Anglo-Saxon system.
11Several venture capitalists expressed a dislike for what they perceived as “academic arrogance.”
See also FAZ (06/13/83). 
 
Table 3: Major events preceding the creation of the WFG 
  
 
Date    Description 
 
 
01/01/74  Price for Libyan oil increases by about 323% relative to the 
previous year; for Persian Gulf oil by about 213%. 
 
01/07/74    German government expects zero growth for 1974. 
 
03/10/74  German government states its conviction to stick to its policy of 
high interest rates. Prime rate stays at about 10%. 
 
03/10/74  Nationalization of German banks is seriously discussed. At the 
annual meeting of the umbrella organization of German banks, a 
high-ranking government official threatens to introduce legislation 
to force banks to give up their equity stakes in private companies, 
unless they comply voluntarily.
1 
 
03/74  A Harvard Business School study estimates that about 50% of the 
US direct investments in Germany fail. The same study finds 
evidence that success is positively related to the size of the equity 
stake.    
 
03/21/74 German  inflation  rate rises above 10%. 
 
04/05/74  The spokesman of Deutsche Bank notes in an official statement: 
“This has been the most difficult year for Deutsche Bank since 
World War II.” 
 
04/09/74    US prime rate hits 10%. 
 
04/19/74    US GNP shrinks by 5.8%. Inflation rate is at 10.8%. 
 
04/25/74  Günter Guillaume, close adviser and personal friend of German 
Chancellor Willy Brandt, is arrested for spying on Brandt for the 
GDR (German Democratic Republic). The ‘Guillaume-affaire’ 
topples Chancellor Brandt later the same year. He is succeeded by 
one of his cabinet members, Helmut Schmidt. 
 
(Continued on next page) 
                                                 
1 Ironically, this was Karl-Heinz Pöhl, who went on to become one of the most influential presidents of the 
Deutsche Bundesbank.  
 
Table 3 (continued): Major events preceding the creation of the WFG 
  
 
Date    Description 
 
 
06/26/74  German banking supervision closes the Herstatt bank because of 
excessive losses from speculation in exchange rate markets.  
 
06/27/74  Foreigners abandon Deutsch Mark. German stock market falls 
considerably. Herstatt’s holding company estimates the expected 
losses at DM 10 million. 
 
06/28/74  The umbrella organization of German banks provides a revised 
estimate of the losses by Herstatt: DM 400 million. The full extent 
of the crisis is only gradually revealed, with losses of over DM 1.2 
billion in Germany alone, and over DM 300 million in the US. A 
bitter public debate ensues on who should be culpable and 
financially responsible. 
 
07/22/74    German stock market hits its lowest level in seven years. 
 
08/01/74  German government begins to debate how to strengthen its deposit 
insurance system. 
 
08/08/74  President Richard Nixon resigns. Gerald Ford is appointed 38
th 
president of the United States. 
 
09/11/74  German government allocates DM 900 million in subsidies for 
“endangered sectors of the economy.” 
 
11/07/74  German unemployment rises by over 20% in one month, from 
about 2.4% to about 3%. 
 
12/09/74  Kuwait becomes a major stakeholder in Daimler Benz. The union 
representative on the board of directors publicly states: “Good. As 
long as it is not General Motors or Ford.” 
 
Winter/Spring 74/75   A politically motivated terrorist group, called Bader-Meinhof 
gang, targets prominent conservative politicians in a series of 
violent attacks.   
 
02/16/75  Number of bankruptcies increases by 40% compared to the 
previous year’s level, which had already been a post-war record. 
    
06/09/75  Founding of the WFG in Frankfurt am Main, Germany’s financial 
capital.  The creation of the WFG was in response to the public debates about the eq-
uity and technology-market gaps. In the German ﬁnancial system, only banks were
credible ﬁnanciers that could promote venture capital. However reluctant the banks
may have been, the government had no other choice but to lean on banks to develop
venture capital. From the beginning, there was a divergence of interest between the
banks and government along the following lines. The government was most con-
cerned about the technology-market gap. It preferred the WFG to invest in young,
high technology companies, and considered it an instrument of public policy. The
banks, however, did not want to take on too much risk and were anxious to not appear
to be wielding too much power over small ﬁrms - a reluctance that led one interviewee
to saying that the banks had to be virtually bullied into backing the WFG.
Within this historical context, we now examine more speciﬁc evidence that exposes
the objectives of government and banks as the owners of the WFG. At the creation of
the WFG, its owners speciﬁed four criteria for selecting portfolio companies (Mayer
and Müller (1991))
1. The product or process of the entrepreneur has to be suﬃciently innovative
from a technological point of view.
2. There has to be an identiﬁed target market, and the company has to have a
good chance of becoming proﬁtable.
3. The entrepreneur or entrepreneurial team has to be of a suﬃciently high quality
and have suﬃcient business experience to be able to lead the company to success.
4. The WFG will only ﬁnance companies that could not have obtained ﬁnancing
from other sources.
The fourth criterion is clearly the most puzzling. It encouraged adverse selec-
tion and free riding by entrepreneurs. Indeed, in some cases entrepreneurs used the
screening approval of the WFG to raise ﬁnancing elsewhere. The WFG not only had
to spend resources on its lengthy screening process, but it was then prevented from
competing for these entrepreneurs.
Where did this odd criterion come from? While the government was concerned
about promoting an activity that could crowd out private markets, the criterion
also suited those banks that feared competition from the WFG in their core business.
Thus both the government and the banks had little incentive to maximize the WFG’s
proﬁts. Instead they were more concerned about other stakeholders.
The ﬁrst three criteria identiﬁed technology, markets and the entrepreneurial team
as key success factors, much along textbook lines. One of the problems of the WFG,
h o w e v e r ,w a st od e t e r m i n et h er e l a t i v ei m p o r t a n c eo ft h et h r e ec r i t e r i a . T h eW F G
found itself under considerable pressure from the government to invest based on the
ﬁrst criterion. Fanselow recalls:“(The government representatives) were breathing down my neck, they
were controlling my papers, and they kept telling me: Do this! Do that!“
Fanselow even complained about his own employees, many of whom approached
their work from a public policy perspective.
“They were unwilling to pay attention to market aspects. They literally
refused to inspect ﬁrms on location. They were only interested in the
technological side of a project, in ideas.“
Fanselow was not alone in seeing this friction. Other interviewees underlined the
problem of the WFG with German banks as its owners. Several managers of venture
capital funds operating in Germany all expressed the same idea about the relationship
of retail banks and venture capital - it does not work:
“Fanselow had a hell of a time sitting with the banks and doing equity.
(Retail) bankers can’t do equity.”
“(Retail) bankers don’t make venture capitalists. If they were good enough,
they would already be independent.“
A manager of a big bank-operated venture capital ﬁrm acknowledged as late as
1999 that
“We don’t even seek majority stakes. We don’t have the know-how for
that.“
Apart from lacking the necessary skills, the banks were also concerned about
maintaining their outside reputation. The CEO of a major German bank points out
(Wirtschaftswoche (03/04/83)):
“Even if the bank is only involved in organizing a deal, we have to succeed
in order to preserve our reputation among our clients.“
Moreover, there were no synergistic beneﬁts from working with loan managers of
banks. A WFG oﬃcial noted:
“Our passive deal sourcing approach did not work out. The banks only
referred bad deals to us.”
Soon after taking charge, Fanselow challenged the investment approach of the
WFG. It was his objective to turn the WFG around into a ﬁnancially viable and
purely market-oriented venture capital ﬁrm. After a confrontational board meeting
and strong resistance especially from the government-appointed board members, the
WFG dropped the fourth criterion. Furthermore, Fanselow received the freedom toapply the ﬁrst criterion less rigorously: it became possible to justify investments based
on market opportunities instead of technological innovation.12 Fanselow remembers:
“I told the banks that we wanted to make money. Most banks didn’t like
the idea and they didn’t want me to do that.“
The irony is that management fought for shareholder wealth-maximization, whereas
the actual shareholders took a stakeholder perspective.
Is there any evidence that these conﬂicts of interest mattered? Did Fanselow’s
confrontation bring about any tangible change? Figure 6 shows how in his ﬁrst
years (1979-82) Fanselow slowed down new investments to focus on stabilizing the
WFG. By 1982, however, he launched a new series of investments. Figures 7 and 8
show changes in the portfolio composition across these diﬀerent investment periods.
Fanselow considered the early stage market in his own words “a catastrophe,“ yet
this was what the government wanted most from the WFG.13 We therefore examine
whether Fanselow’s confrontation with the WFG’s own shareholders had any signiﬁ-
cant eﬀect. We are interested in testing for structural breaks in the portfolio of the
WFG. First, was there a change in the portfolio composition of the WFG in terms of
the stage of companies it invested in? And second, was there an improvement in the
performance of the fund?
To examine this, we ran a number of tests (see table 5). The Wilcoxon test (also
known as Ranksum, or Mann-Whitney test) checks for diﬀerences in the distribution
of two random vectors. It is non-parametric and distribution free, and hence appro-
p r i a t ew h e nt h eu n d e r l y i n gd i s t r i b u t i o ni sn o n - n o r m a l ,o rt h es a m p l es i z ei ss m a l l .W e
use rankable information on the stage of portfolio companies as well as their degree
of success. STAGE measures the portfolio structure with respect to the stage (matu-
rity) of the venture - it counts the frequency of companies in the following categories:
product development and market testing; market entry; and growth and other late
stages. SUCCESS measures the portfolio success - the frequency of investments that
resulted in a loss (bankruptcy or sale with loss) vs. a sale with gain. We aggregate
these two vectors over two sub-samples, namely the time period before Fanselow’s ar-
rival (1976-78) and after (1979-84). Because several of the changes Fanselow initiated
were not fully implemented before 1981, we also compare 1976-1978 with 1981-1984.
We call this comparison late, and the ﬁrst early. We want to test whether the data
12Fanselow’s confrontation with his own investors was accompanied by a shift of power towards
management. Before Fanselow, the board had replaced several CEOs, while the board itself remained
mostly unchanged. Under Fanselow, it was board members who were replaced, with a total of nine
board changes after 1979.
13
Fanselow is hardly alone in his assessment. Another interviewee noted “In the early











































































































































































































Changes in the portfolio structure before and after Fanselow 
 
This table presents the results from two Wilcoxon rank-sum tests, which is also known as 
the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test. The vector STAGE_RANK measures the frequency of 
companies in the following categories: product development, market testing, market 
entry, and growth and other late stages. The vector SUCCESS_RANK measures the 
frequency of investments with the following outcomes: bankruptcy, sale with loss, sale at 
cost (buy back), and sale with gain. Both vectors have a natural ordinal (ranking) 
structure. In the first table we compare the data for 1976-1978 with the data for 1979-
1984. In the second table we compare the data for 1976-1978 with the data for 1982-
1984. W-statistic is the Wilcoxon statistic of the test. The p-values are based on the 




First  table    STAGE_RANK    SUCCESS_RANK 
  
 
Variance  adjusted  for  ties  11.86      11.86 
 
W-statistic    -1.307      -0.290 
 
p-value   0.1913      0.7715 
 
   





Second  table    STAGE_RANK    SUCCESS_RANK 
 
 
Variance  adjusted  for  ties  11.43      11.29 
 
W-statistic    -0.000      -0.447 
 
p-value   1.000      0.6552 
 
     
Group  size    4      4 
 
 represent independent draws from the same underlying probability distribution before
and under Fanselow.
Table 5 shows the test results. Both based on the early and late comparison,
we can reject the hypothesis that the distribution of STAGE is the same before
and under Fanselow. The result is clearer for the late comparison. This indicates
that there was indeed a structural break in the portfolio mix. Did this increase the
ﬁnancial success of the WFG? While the number of successful ventures did increase
from 22.5 % before to 29.12 % under Fanselow in the early comparison, and to 42.86
% in the late comparison, the diﬀerence is not statistically signiﬁcant in the early
case. In the late case, the results are somewhat signiﬁcant. It can be argued that
t h el a t ec o m p a r i s o ni sm o r et e l l i n gb e c a u s ei ta c c o u n t sm o r ef u l l yf o rt h ec h a n g e
initiated by and executed under Fanselow. Hence, we have some evidence that there
was also a structural break in terms of the success of investments. Given the obvious
limitations of the data, we are careful in interpreting these results. The tests, however,
are consistent with the notion that there was a change away from the government’s
initial concept of an early-stage venture capital fund to a later stage private equity
fund and that this change was associated with an improvement in the performance
of the WFG.
After getting rid of the government in 1984, Fanselow created the WFGneu, which
had only ﬁve large banks as its shareholders and focused exclusively on non-venture
private equity deals. In 1988, the WFGneu was disbanded once again and its portfolio
taken over by the newly created DBG with only two banks as its owners. Later the
D B Gw a sr e n a m e dD B A Ga n ds p u no ﬀ as an independent public company with
no bank control. It is currently a leader among Germany’s private equity ﬁrms.
Commenting about the long transition path from the WFG to the DBAG, we were
told:
“ I tw a sv e r yi m p o r t a n tt om o v ea w a yf r o mt h e( r e t a i l )b a n k s .E v e nﬁve
banks were still too much.“
By exposing the conﬂicting objectives of the WFG’s owners, we can explain the
poor performance and the peculiar contracting practices of the WFG: the structure of
the WFG was a product of its institutional environment. We are led to ask whether
these problems were speciﬁc to the WFG, or whether there were broader institu-
tional factors at work. Did other venture capital ﬁrms, which did not suﬀer from
the same institutional path dependence, fare any better? And if not, what were the
institutional obstacles faced by venture capital ﬁrms, be they domestic or foreign?7 Entrepreneurship as a precondition for venture
capital
Conjecture 3 The lack of high quality entrepreneurs and entrepreneurial incentives
in the German system played a key role in the failure of the WFG, and the venture
capital industry at large.
In trying to untangle what aspects of the WFG’s failure can be attributed to its
particular structure and what aspects were endemic to the German economic system,
it is instructive to look at the experiences of those independent venture capital ﬁrms
that subsequently entered the German venture capital market. In the early eighties,
a number of German venture capital funds modeled themselves after the emerging
US example of small independent partnerships. Some Anglo-Saxon funds entered
from the US and the UK. These venture capitalists felt the same constraints on their
investor rights. Unlike the WFG, which was captive to the banks and government,
they could have sought diﬀerent contracts. They did not. We learned this the hard
way. When we asked one venture capitalist whether he had ever considered the
possibility of taking a controlling stake in a company, he replied with visible irritation:
“How much do you know about German venture capital to even suggest
such an idea?”
Another venture capitalist noted quite explicitly:
“ Av e n t u r ec a p i t a l i s tw h oh a dc o m et oG e r m a n yw i t ht h eU Sm e n t a l i t y
would have quickly drowned.“
We have anecdotal evidence for this. When 3I entered the German market in the
early 1980s, they had established themselves as a market leader for venture capital
in Great Britain. The lead manager for Germany soon realized that any controlling
stakes would be impossible, and generally that
“What worked in Britain simply did not work in Germany.“
The independent venture capital funds of the early eighties performed poorly. No
fund achieved noteworthy returns, and many lost signiﬁcant amounts of money.14 One
now very successful venture capitalist sardonically answered how he exited companies
in the 1980s:
“I declared them bankrupt.“
14Only three funds from the eighties survive to the present. GENES suﬀered losses throughout
the eighties and early nineties, Hannover survived by focusing mostly on non-venture private equity
and TVM diversiﬁed into the US to survive.This evidence suggests that some of the problems of the WFG applied to the
market in general. What did the German market miss? The replies we got all agreed:
human capital. We were told:
“Anybody assuming entrepreneurial risk would have been considered fool-
ish.”
The UK venture capitalist in Germany said:
“We were struck by the almost complete lack of interesting deals in Eu-
rope’s biggest economy. We originally planned on hiring two new man-
agers for our company per year, but there was not even enough to do for
these two.“
Why this lack of entrepreneurship? Consider again ﬁrst the historical context. In
the ﬁfties and early sixties a generation of entrepreneurs had built the German after-
war economy. By the late sixties, however, the next generation faced a very diﬀerent
set of incentives for entrepreneurship. Young Germans sought to join large companies
and banks, which typically provided lifetime employment at high wages and excellent
beneﬁts combined with high social status. Given such life-time employment, an
employee that left a corporation - say to start her own business - could not expect
to be rehired by that company and would have faced considerable obstacles to later
take a comparable job with another corporation.15 We heard:
“Success was viewed negatively and with jealousy. And if an entrepreneur
failed, then his career was over.“
This quote neatly summarizes the entrepreneurs’ dilemma in Germany. Success-
ful entrepreneurs were to face envy. High tax rates limited the returns to an en-
trepreneurial venture.16 And failure would not only earn negative social stigma, it
might ﬁnancially ruin the entrepreneur. While German bankruptcy laws are similar
to those in many developed countries, it was standard practice for banks to require
personal guarantees from entrepreneurs.
In the seventies and eighties, the social status of entrepreneurs in Germany was
far from glamorous, in a way that is hard to imagine from an Anglo-Saxon perspec-
tive (from a contemporaneous German perspective as well). In the seventies, market
capitalism was far from being embraced by the younger generation (which would con-
stitute a pool of potential entrepreneurs). The youth organization of the then ruling
15See, for example, Freeman (1998) or Wirtschaftswoche (03/04/83, 03/11/83). Germans were
even very reluctant to change positions within a corporation (see FAZ (09/11/74)). Szyperski and
Klandt (1983) also note that in Germany young enterprises had great diﬃculty in hiring the most
talented engineers.
16See Nevermann and Falk (1986) for a thorough treatment of the tax diﬀerence between Germany
and the US at the time.socialist party (JUSOS) openly declared their hostility to a market economy and de-
manded the socialization of much of private enterprise.17 But this level of skepticism
was not just held by left-wingers. A public opinion poll from 1974 conveys how nega-
tively many Germans viewed their entrepreneurs (FAZ (09/12/74)). 36% supported
partial or complete abolition of private ownership of companies and banks. 50% be-
lieved that the cause of inﬂation was that “entrepreneurs made too much proﬁt.“ 27%
believed that the only thing that entrepreneurs did was “to proﬁtf r o mo t h e rp e o p l e ’ s
work.” And only 41% believed that entrepreneurs could be “competent.“ Some got
so disenchanted with Germany’s social market economy that a small minority even-
tually resorted to various violent forms of terrorism. Table 3 provides some further
historical background about the political and economic conditions.
Hardly surprising that so few people desired to be entrepreneurs. Yet lack of
incentives aﬀected not just the quantity, but also the quality of entrepreneurs. The
1984 annual report of the WFG extensively discussed the German venture capital
market (WFG (1984), underline original):
“We would welcome if the general discussion would focus more on where
the discrepancy between supply and demand lies. We want to point out
here that, in our opinion, it is very important for the German venture capi-
tal market that experienced managers and experienced teams become the
ones demanding venture capital, by becoming entrepreneurs through start-
ups, spin-oﬀs or buy-outs.“
One interviewee explained:
“Back then the most promising young people wanted to work for Siemens
or Nixdorf. Entrepreneurship was taken up by those who could not make
it in large companies - companies that occasionally actively encouraged
them to leave.“
The WFG kept fairly detailed records on the number of entrepreneurs that ap-
proached it for funding - an average of 150 business plans per year. Given that in the
e a r l yy e a r st h eW F Gw a sam o n o p o l i s ti nG e r m a n y ,t h i si sat i n yn u m b e r . T o d a y ,
one medium-sized US venture capital ﬁrm may well get a thousand business plans per
year. Beyond their sheer number, venture capitalists care about the quality of the en-
trepreneurs that approach them for ﬁnancing. We therefore examine the WFG’s data
on business plans. The WFG carefully tracked the selection process of business plans,
and so there is data on how many of them received further attention. The screening
process identiﬁed those companies that met some quality threshold, and the WFG
would make its ﬁnal selection from these. The percentage of companies that met the
screening threshold is a natural measure of the quality of entrepreneurs. We deﬁne
17See for example, FAZ (09/12/74, 11/29/74, 09/01/75). Anecdotically, the current German
chancellor, Gerhard Schröder, became the leader of the JUSOS in 1978.QUALITY as the ratio of the number of ﬁrms that passed the quality screen, over
the number of ﬁrms applying to the WFG. We then examine how this quality mea-
sure relates to the success of the WFG (table 6). We ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant,
positive impact. Hence, there is evidence that is consistent with the notion that the
quality of entrepreneurs is important for the success of a venture capital fund. The
success rate of the venture capital fund may also depend on the number of bets made.
We therefore reran the regression, controlling for CHOICE, which measures the ratio
of the number of companies that the WFG actually invested in over the number of
companies that passed the screen. We ﬁnd that the inclusion of CHOICE does not
alter our results.
Let’s summarize how the three hypotheses interact so far. The inability to exercise
governance control over its portfolio companies exposed the WFG gravely to the
quality of the entrepreneurs. Once they had invested in a company, they had to live
with the entrepreneur. Therefore, the government’s refusal to pay attention to any
investment criterion other than the technological merit was particularly questionable.
8S t o c k m a r k e t s a n d v e n t u r e c a p i t a l
Conjecture 4 The existence of an active stock market is a necessary, but not a
suﬃcient condition for the development of an active venture capital industry.
Black and Gilson (1997) argue that venture capital cannot ﬂourish in a bank-based
system. Venture capitalists assume extensive control rights. An active stock market
helps the investors to exit and entrepreneurs to regain control over their companies.
Therefore, the lack of an active stock market in Germany, they believe, prevented the
emergence of a German venture capital industry.
While the Black and Gilson conjecture correctly identiﬁes the importance of a
stock market, a more careful analysis of the evidence suggests a subtler picture. The
introduction of an active stock market alone does not ease the contractual problems
between entrepreneurs and investors. The Black and Gilson argument relies on the
assumption that investors take control before the IPO and that entrepreneurs regain
control after. While this assumption may be valid for the US, we have seen that in
Germany investors had great diﬃculty to take control rights away from entrepreneurs.
Moreover, while it is true that Germany’s IPO market was very small - only 17
companies were newly listed on German stock exchanges from 1977 to 1982 (the US
saw 448 IPOs in 1981 alone) -, the WFG nevertheless was able to take two companies
public. Given that it had at total of eight successful companies (after buy-backs), a
rate of 25 % of IPOs among successful investments is not low and hardly responsible
for the WFG’s problems.
It might help to look at these apparent contradictions using the theory of com-
plementarities. We have seen that the old German equilibrium was characterized by




The impact of entrepreneurial quality on success 
 
This table presents the results of two OLS regressions. QUALITY is defined as the ratio 
of the number of business proposals considered interesting by the WFG over the total 
number of proposals in a particular year cohort. CHOICE is defined as the ratio of the 
number of new investments over the number of interesting business proposals in a 
particular year cohort. SUCCESS measures the percentage of companies that generated a 
positive return to the WFG in a particular year cohort.  Numbers in parenthesis are t-
ratios using White’s heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors (White, 1980). We also 
report the correlation coefficient between the dependent and independent variables.  
 
 
Regression     QUALITY    QUALITY  and  CHOICE 
 
 
Dependent  variable       SUCCESS     SUCCESS 
 
Intercept        0.0195166     0.0605712 
(0.164) (0.317) 
 
QUALITY     0.2436266*     0.352152* 
     (2.327)      (2.337) 
 
CHOICE          -1.283053 
          (-0.522) 
 
 
Correlation  coefficient     0.4386      0.4386 
 
F-statistic        5.41*      7.13** 
 
R-squared        0.1924      0.2391 
 






*   significantly different from zero at the 10% level 
**   significantly different from zero at the 5% level 
*** significantly different from zero at the 1% level“Availability of money was never the problem. The entrepreneurial envi-
ronment always was.”
The theory of complementarities predicts that a change in one component will
only work if it generates further changes in the system. The mere creation of the
WFG was not suﬃcient for an institutional change. Furthermore, the WFG had
virtually no visibility - while it tried to overcome its lack of visibility with a series of
promotional campaigns, they were too small and had no success (WFG (1979)). The
process of deal origination was described as:
“We tended to look around and then stumble across some deal. Most
recipients had never even heard about venture capital.“
Under these circumstances, it is hardly surprising that the WFG did not reshape
the entrepreneurial attitudes in Germany. Or as a manager familiar with the WFG
for decades said:
“It was as if the WFG had never happened at all.“
But the mere creation of a stock market segment better suited for venture capital
does not create a ﬂourishing venture capital industry either. In 1987 the Geregelter
Markt was introduced in Germany. It catered speciﬁcally to the needs of venture
capital backed ﬁrms (Harrison (1988)). However, the creation had virtually no eﬀect
on the development of a venture capital industry; speciﬁcally, it did not increase the
inclination of managers to create small ventures or to work for them.
Recently, things have changed dramatically (see Fiedler and Hellmann, 2001).
Younger Germans have much greater exposure to US inﬂuences, to Silicon Valley and
the Internet. In the words of one manager:
“The attitude toward risk is changing today, for the generation of thirty
year old, especially in IT, telecom or biotech. These young people either
studied in the Anglo-Saxon world, or they worked for an Anglo-Saxon
company. They bring a new way of thinking. They are no longer content
to just be the assistant to the CEO.“
Fanselow (himself in his ﬁfties) had an even more direct way of saying this:
“Today, you can ﬁnd young managers who are willing to take on risks,
who want to be entrepreneurs. But you can forget anyone over 30 or 35.”
It is in this environment that the latest attempt to create a new stock market
segment for entrepreneurial companies, the so-called Neuer Markt, ﬁnally succeeded.And within the context of these complementary and system-wide changes, the Ger-
man venture capital market ﬁnally also took oﬀ in the last few years.18 The Neuer
Markt itself did not create this broader societal trend. As part of a complementary
system, however, it has undoubtedly contributed to it, especially by providing highly
visible role models for a new generation of entrepreneurs. One interviewee noted:
“Today, we have our ﬁrst millionaires under 30, and everybody knows
that.“
While access to an active stock market is a necessary condition for the development
of a venture capital industry, it is not suﬃcient. An active stock market needs to be
embedded into an environment that has broader incentives for talented managers to
become entrepreneurs. As predicted by the theory of complementarities, a change
in a complementary system (here the introduction of a new stock market segment)
can only be eﬀective if it interacts with other changes in the environment (here the
willingness of talented Germans to engage in entrepreneurial activities).
9C o n c l u s i o n
New theories of corporate governance emphasize complementarities between institu-
tions. This paper looks at the dark side of these complementarities: what happens
if a new institution clashes with the existing system? It studies the natural exper-
iment of the WFG, a venture capital ﬁrm that was explicitly created to initiate a
German venture capital market. We noted the diﬃculties that the WFG encountered
in implementing venture capital in a bank-based system, and analyzed how the WFG
adjusted the concept of venture capital to better ﬁt the German institutional context.
The paper emphasizes a central tenant from the theory of complementarities,
namely that a single deviation in an institutional equilibrium is unproﬁtable. Suc-
cessful institutional innovation requires several changes at a time. It shows how the
introduction of the ﬁrst German venture capital fund did not ﬁt into the environment.
German norms on contracting and corporate governance provided insuﬃcient investor
protection, especially for the ﬁnancing of early stage, high-risk ventures. It also shows
how the institutional environment itself shapes the motivation of the agents that ini-
tiate institutional change - how the incumbent players, the leading German banks,
had greater concern for preserving their existing business and reputation than for
seeking success of new ventures.
The paper then analyzes the larger systemic constraints that had to be relaxed
before a German venture capital market ﬁnally could develop. It was not so much
t h eq u a n t i t ya st h eq u a l i t yo fe n t repreneurs that was lacking. And ﬁnally, the paper
18See Johnson (1999) for an analysis of the Neuer Markt. Kümmerle, Paul and Freye (1998) or
Pﬁrrmann, Wupperfeld and Lerner (1997) also provide an overview of recent developments in the
German venture capital industry.reinterprets the Black and Gilson hypothesis on the importance of an active stock
market for venture capital. It suggests that an active IPO market is a necessary,
but by no means a suﬃcient condition. Venture capital, especially in a bank-based
system, might also need complementary changes of corporate governance and of a
country’s attitude towards entrepreneurship.
The history of the WFG and the development of German venture capital is not
a happy one. But learning from failure is just as important as learning from success.
The failure of the WFG provides a rare natural experiment that allows us to study
the economic forces that contribute to the viability of a venture capital industry. In
an area such as venture capital where relatively little is known about what creates
a favorable environment it would be foolish to ignore the few lessons that history
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